Quantum key establishment via a multimode fiber by Amitonova, Lyubov V. et al.
Quantum key establishment via a multimode 
fiber 
LYUBOV V. AMITONOVA,1,2,* TRISTAN B. H. TENTRUP,1 IVO M. VELLEKOOP,3 
AND PEPIJN W. H. PINKSE1 
1Complex Photonic Systems (COPS), MESA+ Institute for Nanotechnology, University of Twente, PO 
Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands 
2LaserLaB, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
3Biomedical Photonic Imaging, TechMed Institute, University of Twente, PO Box 217, 7500 AE 
Enschede, The Netherlands 
*l.amitonova@vu.nl 
Abstract: Quantum communication aims to provide absolutely secure transmission of secret 
information. State-of-the-art methods encode symbols into single photons or coherent light with 
much less than one photon on average. For long distance communication, typically a single-
mode fiber is used and significant effort has been devoted already to increase the data carrying 
capacity of a single optical line. Here we propose and demonstrate a fundamentally new concept 
for remote key establishment. Our method allows high-dimensional alphabets using spatial 
degrees of freedom by transmitting information through a light-scrambling multimode fiber 
and exploiting the no-cloning theorem. Eavesdropper attacks can be detected without using 
randomly switched mutually unbiased bases. We prove the security with single-photon Fock 
states and with weak coherent light. Since it is optical fiber based, our method allows to 
naturally extend secure communication to larger distances. We experimentally demonstrate this 
new type of key exchange method by encoding information into a few-photon light pulse 
decomposed over guided modes of an easily available multimode fiber. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of secure communication is rapidly growing [1]. We use cryptography in 
everyday life often without noticing, for example, when we conduct financial transactions via 
the internet. The security of conventional cryptography is based on shared secret keys or on 
computational assumptions, such as the presumed hardness of factoring [2]. In practice, this 
means that it is vulnerable to unanticipated advances in hardware or algorithms. Quantum 
cryptography in theory provides unconditional secure communication, assuming only that an 
eavesdropper (Eve) is restricted by the laws of physics: the quantum no-cloning theorem forbids 
to replicate an unknown quantum state [3]. Indeed, the security of quantum cryptography 
requires quantum states of light [4]. For example, in the original and best-known quantum key 
distribution (QKD) method – BB84 proposed by Bennett and Brassard [5] – the security is 
based on the fact that the polarization of a single photon can be prepared and measured along 
well-defined directions. Key-distribution methods do not by themselves communicate useful 
information, but such a communication can follow with the proven-secure one-time-pad 
method after the secure key is built up. 
Nowadays, optical fibers are key elements of worldwide communication networks [6]. 
Single-mode fibers are widely used to transmit voice, television and internet data. The ultimate 
goal is to increase the data-carrying capacity of a single line. Combining multiple strands of 
fiber in a single optical cable enable various spatial division multiplexing schemes. This allows 
the merging of high-dimensional QKD systems with optical fiber transmission. Multicore fibers 
are also being studied for space-division multiplexing [7] and have been used for high-
dimensional QKD [8]. A step-index multimode (MM) fiber supports a significantly higher 
number of modes than a multicore fiber and as a result can transfer information at a higher 
density. Another method for secure communication relies on optical reciprocity in MM fibers 
scrambling wavefronts in a random way [9]. 
Although short pieces of straight or slightly bent fiber are not truly random [10], in any 
realistic fiber random bends, index imperfections, and other perturbations cause the signal to 
couple into multiple modes [11], leading to an arbitrary mixing of field amplitudes [12] and 
scrambling the information across the modes. However, it is well-known that the mode mixing 
can be partially undone by applying techniques from complex wavefront shaping, a method 
originally developed for precise light control through and in highly scattering materials [13–
15]. Recently methods have been proposed for high-speed [16], high-resolution [17,18] image 
transfer. Multimode optical fibers can now also be used to transmit information in the spatial 
domain [19–21]. However, these methods are not secure. 
Here we propose a new method for secure key establishment via a MM fiber. The idea is 
based on secure characterization of the multimode transmission channel by means of weak light 
pulses. As can be seen in Fig. 1, both the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob, control a stretch 
of fiber that is randomly bent so that it spatially scrambles the optical communication signal. 
Our method is designed such that: 
1) Alice and Bob can characterize the scrambled communication channel in a calibration 
phase and undo the scrambling using complex wavefront shaping in the 
communication phase. 
2) By merit of the no-cloning theorem, Eve cannot decode the signal without physically 
reproducing the exact configuration of the scramblers used by Alice and Bob. 
3) By merit of the same theorem, Eve cannot determine the configurations of the 
scramblers, even when she is intercepting the optical signals in the calibration and/or 
communication phases. Since she doesn’t know the configuration of the scramblers, 
by 2), she cannot decode the signal. 
4) If Eve tries to hide her interception by resending light to Bob, this can easily be 
detected. We can quantify the amount of information that she can collect when tapping 
only a small portion of the signal. 
Elements 1, 2 and 4 are sufficient to ensure secure key establishment in the case that Eve 
has no method to build a physical copy of the entire multimode communication channel. 
Element 3 ensures that our method remains secure in the case that Eve has access to some 
technology to clone or mimic exactly the stretches of distorted multimode fiber. The fiber 
nature of the proposed method allows straightforward implementation of long-distance 
communication. 
Our method does not require the light to be in an entangled (or otherwise special) quantum 
state. Nowadays, many QKD systems (including commercially available ones) rely on a weak 
coherent state due to its simplicity. However, only since the introduction of decoy protocols, 
weak coherent states do not compromise security if less than one photon per pulse is 
used [22,23]. We prove that our method is secure with weak coherent light even when several 
photons per symbol are used without raising the complexity of the method by implementing 
the decoy states. However, the concept of decoy states can be used to further improve the 
performance of our method. 
In contrast to traditional QKD our method doesn’t require two mutual unbiased bases, 
which are conventionally used to detect Eve’s attacks. As a result, it also doesn’t need a 
quantum-key-sifting step. It is important to mentioned that some modern QKD protocols, such 
as coherent one-way (COW) [24,25], also do not rely on mutually unbiased bases and allows 
to transfer the data in deterministic way. In COW, Alice sends full and empty pulses and Bob 
temporally distinguishes them. The COW protocol is also well suited for fiber-based quantum 
communication [26]. In contrast to our proposed approach, COW allows to transmit only one 
bit of the information per pulse and implements a decoy states for security.  
2. THE METHOD 
Firstly, we briefly discuss the main idea of the method under ideal conditions assuming a perfect 
single-photon source and ideal wavefront shaping (in phase and amplitude), since this is the 
simplest to understand conceptually. Later, we give a quantitative argument why the method is 
still secure with weak coherent light and imperfect wavefront shaping without any adaptation 
to the method or the setup. The experimental setup and illustration of the main principle are 
presented in Fig. 1. Alice and Bob each have under full control a short fragment of MM fiber, 
which act as a ‘scrambler’. They both ‘program’ the scrambler in a random way by applying a 
random conformational change to the fiber. In the calibration phase, Alice and Bob perform a 
stepwise sequential wavefront shaping algorithm [27,28]: Alice generates a plane wave with a 
single segment that is phase shifted. Bob records a camera frame and sends it to Alice via a 
classical channel. This is repeated for each segment several times. After this calibration phase, 
Alice can now use wavefront shaping to focus light on any desired position on Bob’s camera. 
In this way, we can encode a high-dimensional alphabet into the guided modes of a multimode 
fiber. The set of special superpositions of fiber modes that lead to light focused at desired points 
on Bob’s side we will call a basis. 
To send a symbol, Alice prepares a single-photon quantum state with an appropriately 
phase-shaped and amplitude-shaped wavefront that leads to a focus of light at the particular 
position on the fiber output facet. Throughout the fiber, the single photon will be present as a 
disordered superposition of almost all fiber modes. If a potential eavesdropper Eve would 
intercept the photon and determine its position, the photon collapses at a nearly random position 
on Eve’s detector, which varies even between identical copies of the same symbol (see Fig. 1 
‘Eve’). Therefore, Eve will not be able to identify what symbol was sent: the information is 
scrambled. Only at Bob’s end, the photon will be spatially localized at the target position, where 
each target position corresponds to a symbol from the alphabet (see Fig. 1 ‘Bob’). Since here 
the photon is spatially localized, Bob can unambiguously identify what symbol was sent: the 
information is unlocked. As a result, Bob can decode the information instantaneously during 
the communication via the multimode fiber. Under ideal conditions, no classical postprocessing 
is required. In case of nonperfect wavefront shaping and/or losses within the system, Bob 
reports to Alice which characters should be discarded from the final key, as a last step. 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental setup. Alice encodes a symbol by coupling light with an appropriate phase 
pattern into a multimode fiber. Bob receives a signal focused at a particular position on the fiber 
output facet (see ‘Full field’ on Bob’s part). Bob can reconstruct the position even with a single 
detected photon (see ‘Single photons’ on Bob’s part). With mirror M2 Eve can tap off the signal 
in the middle of the fiber. However, due to the mode-mixing nature of the multimode fiber, her 
intensity distribution is a complex interference pattern (see ‘Full field’ on Eve’s part). The 
positions of her photon detections are random and vary even for different realizations of the 
same symbol (see ‘Single photons’ on Eve’s part). As a result, Eve cannot reconstruct the symbol 
that Alice sent. Abbreviations: MM fiber, multimode fiber; DMD, digital micromirror device; 
SM fiber, single mode fiber; M, mirror; L, lens; Obj, objective; P, pinhole; C, collimator; Cam, 
camera. 
The summary of the protocol is as follows: 
- Alice and Bob randomly scramble the optical communication channel and characterize 
it for S detectors in a secure way by using a low number of photons and the modified 
sequential wavefront shaping algorithm. Alice checks the mutual interference of all the 
measured wavefronts to verify the security of the wavefront shaping 
- Alice prepares light in one of the S states by applying a spatial phase profile and sends 
it to Bob on the quantum channel. Bob measured the intensities at S detectors. This step 
is repeated many times to generate the raw key. 
- Alice and Bob communicate over the classical channel and estimate a raw key. Than 
they reveal a random sample of the bits of their raw keys and estimate the error rate in 
the quantum channel.  
- If the security is verified by an acceptable low error rate, Alice and Bob generate the 
secret key with the classical processes of error correction and privacy amplification and 
obtain a shared secret key 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Experimental demonstration 
We perform our experiments in imperfect ‘real-life’ conditions: with a weak coherent light 
source, in the presence of noise, and assuming only a moderate efficiency of wavefront shaping. 
First, the fiber is calibrated in its current configuration as described in the Supplementary 
Materials. In the experiments, we use a fiber with an approximate number of 1500 modes 
(N = 1500) and the alphanumeric: 36-dimensional alphabet consisting of A-Z + 0-9 (case 
insensitive) symbols. The symbols are encoded into 36 different positions on the fiber output 
facet, as presented in faint green circles in Fig. 2(a). 
In the first set of experiments, we emulate the perfect single-photon source by taking into 
account only the frames with single-photon detection events. Snapshots of the spatial 
distributions of photons measured by Bob and by Eve are presented in Fig. 2(a) and 2(b), 
respectively. For clarity, we show frames which correspond to the fidelity of wavefront shaping 
α2 = 0.6 (for the definition of fidelity see Supplementary Materials) and for only two different 
symbols sent by Alice by open and filled dots. Different colors represent 10 different repetitions 
of each of the two symbols. The dashed line shows the fiber core edge. In contrast to Eve, Bob 
clearly sees the correlation between different realizations of the same symbol. In case of a 
perfect single-photon light source, the probability for Bob to detect the photon in the correct 
position is equal to the fidelity of wavefront shaping that, as was shown before, can 
experimentally reach a theoretical maximum of π/4 for phase-only wavefront shaping [19]. In 
contrast, different realizations of the same field pattern hardly correlate to each other on Eve’s 
side (see Fig. 2(b)). 
In the second set of experiments, we characterize the communication between Alice and 
Bob for low-fidelity wavefront shaping, α2 = 0.1, and assuming a weak coherent light source 
with an average number of photons per pulse µ2 starting from 2. Alice sends each of the 36 
symbols 200 times in random order. Each time, Bob reads the signal on the fiber output and 
estimates what symbol was sent. Bob can use two main strategies. In the first strategy, Bob 
compares the number of photons in different predefined areas and chooses the one with the 
highest intensity. In the second strategy, Bob selects only those transmissions for which he is 
very sure what symbol was sent by accepting only the symbols with at least as many photons 
as a particular threshold. Whenever Bob has more information than Eve, the few-percent error 
rate can be corrected down to the standard 10-9 during the (classical) error correction step of 
the protocol [29]. 
We investigate the percentage of the correct reading and the rejection ratio for two different 
thresholds. Then we repeat the whole procedure for a different average number of photons per 
pulse. The results averaged over all 36 symbols are presented in Fig. 2(c), where the probability 
p to detect the correct symbol versus the average number of photons in a pulse, µ2 is plotted for 
different strategies of Bob: black, no threshold; red, two-photon threshold and blue, three-
photon threshold. Dots represent the experimentally measured data. The black line shows the 
theoretical prediction from the following formula 𝑝 = 𝑒$%& ∑ [𝐹(𝑘 − 1)]0$1𝜆13/𝑘!6378 , where 𝐹(𝑘) = 𝑒$%9 ∑ 𝜆:; /𝑙!3;78  is the cumulative distribution function of the Poisson distribution, λ1 is 
the average number of photons at the “correct” position, λ2 is the average number of photons at 
the “wrong” position, and S is the total number of symbols. Values λ1 = 0.1µ2 and λ2 = 0.005µ2 
were extracted from the experimental data. The blue and red lines represent the results of 
simulations of Bob’s probability for a threshold of 2 photons and 3 photons, respectively. 
Although even in the case of low fidelity of wavefront shaping (α2 = 0.1) and no threshold the 
probability of reading the correct answer is significant, it dramatically increases for strategies 
with a threshold. The rejection rates are also carefully analyzed and presented in Fig. 2(d) for 
a threshold of 2 photons (red bars) and 3 photons (blue bars). The width of the bars corresponds 
to the standard deviation of the number of photons in a pulse and increases according to the 
Poisson distribution. As a result, Bob can read information with an error rate close to zero. 
 
Fig. 2. (a, b) Snapshots of the spatial distributions of photons measured by Bob (a) and by Eve 
(b) in the case of a perfect single-photon source and a fidelity of wavefront shaping α2 = 0.6. The 
open and filled dots correspond to two different symbols sent by Alice. Different colors represent 
10 different repetitions of each of the symbols. The dashed line indicates the fiber core edge. 
Faint green circles on Bob’s facet represent the symbol areas. In contrast to the photon 
distribution measured by Eve, Bob clearly sees the correlation between different realizations of 
the same symbol. (c) The measured probability of Bob to detect the correct symbol versus the 
average number of photons in a pulse for wavefront shaping fidelity α2 = 0.1, a weak coherent 
light source and different strategies: Bob uses no threshold (black); Bob accepts only symbols 
that have been triggered by two or more photons (red) and three or more photons (blue). Vertical 
error bars represent the standard deviation after averaging over 36 symbols. Solid lines show the 
theoretical calculations of the probabilities as described in the main text. (d) The rejection rate 
for a threshold of 2 photons (red bars) and 3 photons (blue bars) versus the average number of 
detected photons in a pulse. The width of the bars corresponds to the standard deviations of the 
number of photons in a pulse. 
3.2 Security analysis for a single-photon light source 
Let us assume that the eavesdropper can tap off the signal somewhere in the middle of the fiber. 
Eve can only retrieve a fraction of the information that was sent by taking snapshots of the 
complex wavefronts in the fiber, since she cannot sort the wavefronts in S symbols in a passive 
linear way such as happens at Bob’s fiber end. In order to employ classical error correction and 
privacy amplification, it is necessary that HB > HE [29]. In Supplementary Materials, we derive 
a strict upper limit for the amount of information that Eve can gain in case of a single-photon 
light source as ⟨HE⟩ = (1 – γ)/ln2 ≈ 0.61 bit per transmitted symbol regardless of the number of 
symbols or the number of modes, where γ is the Euler constant. Under the same conditions Bob 
at maximum can have HB = log2(S) ≈ 5.2 bit of information per transmitted symbol for S = 36 
symbols. As a result, ⟨HE⟩ ≪ HB, guaranteeing the security of the method for a single-photon 
light source. 
3.3 Security analysis for weak coherent light 
If rather than single photons weak coherent light is used, phase measurements are possible. 
Here we consider that Eve performs perfect phase measurements. The fundamental limit of the 
best possible fidelity β2 with which Eve can measure the wavefront with a low photon budget 
is determined by the following expression: β2 = µ2/(µ2 + 2N) (see Ref. [30] for the details), 
where µ2 is the average number of photons per pulse sent by Alice and N the number of fiber-
guided modes. Figure 3(a) represents Eve’s best possible fidelity β2 as a function of the number 
of photons, µ2, and the number of modes, N. We see that even for a high number of photons 
measured by Eve the fidelity β2 << 1. As a result, an intercept-resend attack significantly 
decreases the proportion of energy in the focus at Bob’s side:  α2 → α2 β2 resulting in radical 
rise of the error rate (see Supplementary Materials Eqs. S7-9 for the details). For β2 < 0.01, an 
intercept-resend attack on all photons would induce a qudit error rate of more than 0.9. 
We now calculate the amount of information per transmitted symbol that Eve can retrieve 
at best. The example for N = 1500 fiber modes and S = 36 symbols is presented in Fig. 3(b) 
where the blue line represents the exact upper limit (evaluated through numerical integration, 
and the red line represents a simple closed-form analytical upper limit (see Supplementary 
Materials Eqs. S16-18 for the details). We see that HE is below the maximum entropy 
achievable by Bob (log2 S) even when the average number of photons exceeds unity. We 
analyze how many photons Eve needs to measure to get the same amount of information as 
Bob has (Eq. S6). The results are present in Fig. 3(c), showing the maximum number of photons 
detected by Eve per symbol for which HE	< HB, plotted as a function of the wavefront-shaping 
fidelity, α2 and the number of modes, N for the number of symbols S = 36. Even in the case of 
a weak coherent light source with more than 1 photon per pulse on average Eve is not able to 
retrieve full information. Note that we have to explicitly exclude the scenario where Eve knows 
part of the message, since in this case she could sum the measurements for corresponding 
symbols together, eventually collecting enough information. Therefore, our method is limited 
to distributing messages which appear completely random to Eve. 
The security of the method against intercept-resend attack is based on a robust way to detect 
the presence of Eve. To estimate the maximum secure distance, we calculate the qudit error 
rate by using Eqs. S7-9 and state-of-the art parameters of the fiber and the detection system: 
low-loss fiber with attenuation coefficient of 0.2 dB/km, the efficiency and dark count rate of 
the detectors are 65% and pdark =  7.2×10−8, respectively [31]. The results are presented in Fig. 
3(d) where the secure qudit error rate between Alice and Bob is plotted as a function of the 
fiber length, L, for N = 5000 modes, wavefront shaping fidelity α2 = 0.7, and the average number 
of emitted photons µ2 is 0.1 (the black line), 1 (the red line), and 10 (the blue line). An intercept-
resend attack on all photons induces an error rate of more than 0.9 at best (the grey dashed line). 
As a result, the presence of Eve can be easily detected and the protocol is secure even in case 
of a weak coherent light source for more than 200 km of the propagation distance (Fig. 3(d)). 
 
Fig. 3. (a) The fundamental limit of the best possible fidelity β2 with which Eve can measure the 
wavefront with a low photon budget as a function of the number of photons, µ2 and the number 
of modes, N. (b) Entropy per transmitted symbol gained by Eve for N = 1500 fiber modes and S 
= 36 symbols. The connected blue dots represent the exact entropy function (evaluated through 
numerical integration) and the red line is a closed form expression that gives a simple upper limit 
(see Supplementary Materials for the details). The result is independent of the wavefront shaping 
fidelity. (c) The maximum number of photons per symbol measured by Eve that guaranties 
security (HE < HB) as a function of wavefront shaping fidelity, α2 and the number of modes N, 
for an alphabet consisting of S = 36 symbols. (d) The fractional secure qudit error rate  (error per 
detected symbol) plotted as a function of the fiber length, L, for N = 5000 modes, wavefront 
shaping fidelity α2 = 0.7 (the small circle in (c) ), and the average number of emitted photons µ2 
= 0.1 (the black solid line), 1 (the red solid line), and 10 (the blue solid line). An intercept-resend 
attack on all photons induces an error rate of at least 0.9 (grey dashed line). 
One may argue that Eve could, hypothetically, copy and physically reproduce all essential 
features of the fiber between Eve and Bob in some passive optical system that would focus each 
symbol onto a different detector. Constructing such a programmable mode sorter which 
implements any linear transmission matrix is theoretically possible, although it remains an 
extremely challenging technological problem [32,33]. However, even with the ultimate 
technology, Eve cannot build a mode sorter without knowledge of the exact transmission 
matrix. Obviously, Eve cannot directly measure the transmission matrix of the scramblers of 
Alice and Bob because these parts of the fiber are always kept under the control of Alice and 
Bob. Therefore, we only have to make sure that Eve cannot find out the transmission matrix by 
intercepting the calibration phase and/or the communication phase. 
Now we consider a photon-number splitting attack. We assume that Eve can perfectly 
measure a transmission matrix of the whole fiber except the scrambled parts of Alice and Bob 
and can build an ideal lossless high-dimensional mode sorter. In that case Eve can in principle 
choose to measure only a fraction of the photons and propagate the unmeasured photons to 
Bob’s scrambler without losses. We demonstrated that Eve needs to measure a relatively large 
number of photons to get the same information as Bob (see Fig. 3(c)). To keep the protocol 
secure against a photon-number splitting attack, the total number of photons per symbol sent 
by Alice should be less than the secure number of photons in Fig.3(c). 
3.4 Security analysis for calibration phase 
To ensure that Eve cannot intercept the calibration phase, we made two small modifications to 
the stepwise sequential wavefront shaping algorithm. First of all, Alice sends the wavefronts in 
a random order, so that Eve does not know what pattern was sent. Second, Alice sends spatially 
shaped waves that only contain a low number of photons at a time. Alice changes the phase of 
a single segment of the light modulator, meaning that the wavefront is largely plane. We can 
describe this wave as a superposition of a plane wave and a part corresponding to the modulated 
segment. Since the intensity is distributed equally over all 𝑁CDE segments, the value of 𝜇: used 
in the analysis (see Supplementary Materials) would be 𝜇: = 𝑛HI/𝑁CDE, with 𝑛HI the average 
number of photons send during a single pulse in the calibration measurement (in our case, 
amounting to 𝜇: = (80 ± 30)/1156 ≈ 0.07 photons). From this measurement Eve cannot 
determine what symbol was sent with any reasonable confidence: the best possible fidelity β2 
with which Eve can measure the symbol is less than 1/N meaning a random result. So, she 
cannot intercept the calibration phase and retrieve the transmission matrix. Note that the plane-
wave component of the wavefront contains much more energy. However, this component does 
not carry any information, so Eve does not gain anything by intercepting it. 
After all measurements, Alice sums all corresponding frames for each measurement. She 
now has high-contrast speckle images that she can use to calculate the transmission matrix. Eve 
on the other hand, does not know what frames belong to what measurement, so she has no way 
to combine the frames into a high-quality image. In addition, if Eve intercepted the 
communication during the calibration phase, she will have sent arbitrary wavefronts to Bob, 
thereby breaking the correlation between Alice’s transmitted field and Bob’s response. As a 
result, when Alice now sums the corresponding frames, she will get low-contrast (uniformly 
distributed) images. This way, Alice can detect the presence of Eve without giving away any 
information. 
4. DISCUSSION 
In our experiments, the bit rate was limited by the speed of the camera. With high-speed 
cameras or avalanche photodiode arrays, the limitation of the proposed method might be the 
speed at which phase masks can be changed. An ultrafast digital micromirror device can be 
used to encode patterns with a speed as high as 97 kHz [34]. Together with the high 
dimensionality of the used alphabet (HB = log2 36 = 5.2 bit per pulse) and unity wavefront 
shaping fidelity, it gives rise to a secure bit rate of up to 0.5 Mb/s. The bit rate can be increased 
up to 1 Mb/s without any changes in the setup and equipment by increasing the number of 
symbols [35] and the number of guided modes of the multimode fiber. Commercially available 
multimode fibers support up to 3·106 modes, and allows to increase the dimensionality of the 
quantum channel and consequently the level of security. 
To address the maximal fiber length that could be used in the proposed method of remote 
key establishment, we analyze pulse spreading within the multimode fiber. A high bit rate limits 
possible laser bandwidth and, as a result, its coherence length, which is of key importance for 
effective wavefront shaping: Δf < c/(ncL(1/cos(NA/nc) – 1)), where Δf is the spectral 
bandwidth, nc is the core refractive index, and L is the maximum fiber length (see 
Supplementary Materials of Ref. [20]). We estimate that pulse spreading fundamentally limits 
the fiber length of a standard MM fiber with an NA of 0.2 and n = 1.45 to about 220 km for the 
maximum original bitrate of 1 Mb/s. 
Further, we address the way how losses affect remote key establishment in the proposed 
approach. In principle, losses may leak information to the eavesdropper: for coherent pulses 
this is certainly the case; for single photons it is not [4]. In case of a single-photon light source, 
if a photon does not arrive, the detector does not click and the event is simply discarded. 
Losses in case of a weak coherent light source affects the security of a protocol due to the 
possibility of a photon-number splitting attack. Our analysis shows that for a wavefront shaping 
fidelity α2 = 0.7, number of modes N = 5000, and the average number of photons µ2 = 1, the 
secure qudit error rate is 12% (See Fig. 3(d)) for 220 km distance, whereas Eve needs to 
intercept at least µ2 = 10 photons to get the information (See Fig. 3(c)). As a result, the protocol 
is secure against intercept-resend and photon-number splitting attacks for a distance of 220 km 
(assuming fiber with attenuation coefficient of 0.2 dB/km). The further improvements could be 
done by implementing the concept of decoy states. 
Because of the unique properties of the method we introduce here, data is transferred in a 
deterministic manner, allowing Bob to decode the information instantaneously during the 
communication. Although this potentially allows to directly communicate secretly [36], there 
is always the risk of leaking a fraction of this information to Eve and we do not follow that 
route here and instead assume that our method is used to establish a secret key. 
To summarize, we propose and implement a new type of key exchange method that is secure 
by encoding information into a few-photon light pulse decomposed over guided modes of a 
multimode fiber. The new method is based on the no-cloning theorem combined with random 
light scrambling and secure wavefront shaping. The method guarantees the secure 
establishment of a shared key in case of a single-photon source, as well as in the case of a weak 
coherent light source with a low (relative to the number of modes) photon number. Moreover, 
it works with a high-dimensional alphabet, and can be naturally extended to larger distances. 
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Supplementary material 
1. Experimental setup  
Alice uses the continuous-wave linearly polarized output of a He-Ne laser with a wavelength of 633 nm 
(see Fig. 1 ‘Alice’). Neutral-density filters in combination with a half-wave plate and a polarizing beam 
splitter are used to reduce the power to the desired level. A single-mode fiber is used to clean the laser 
mode and to expand the laser beam in order to match the surface of a spatial light modulator. To control 
the spatial phase of the coupled light with high speed, Alice uses a 1920x1200 Vialux V4100 digital 
micromirror device (DMD). The lenses L1 and L2 are placed in a 4f-configuration to image the phase 
mask on the back focal plane of a coupling objective. A pinhole in the Fourier plane blocks all the 
diffraction orders except the 1st, which encodes the desired spatial phase distribution. An objective with 
NA = 0.4 (Olympus) is used to couple light into a conventional step-index multimode fiber (Thorlabs, 
FG050UGA) with a silica core of dc = 50 µm diameter and numerical aperture NA = 0.22. Such a fiber 
has a normalized frequency V = p dc NA/λ ≈ 55 for our laser wavelength, λ = 633 nm, and sustains 
approximately N = 1500 guided modes [12]. The part of the experimental setup described above belongs 
to Alice and potentially allows encoding the desired symbol with a speed of up to 22 kHz. The multimode 
fiber serves as a quantum channel to deliver symbols to Bob in such a way that anyone who wants to 
listen to the communication at any arbitrary position along the fiber fails. We mimic the situation when 
Eve has access to the fiber without Alice and Bob knowing so, dividing the quantum channel into two 
parts. Each piece of the multimode fiber is 3 meters long. Eve’s part of the setup includes two objectives 
(Olympus, NA = 0.4) served to close a gap between two pieces of fiber and to image the fiber output on 
her camera (see Fig. 1 ‘Eve’). Bob’s part of the setup includes one objective (Olympus, NA = 0.4) to 
image the fiber output on the camera (see Fig. 1 ‘Bob’). Bob and Eve use a high-sensitive intensified 
charge-coupled device (ICCD) camera to detect light at the single-photon level (see ‘Image processing’ 
section). Light will pass from Alice to Eve, where it is split at M2, from where a part falls on Eve’s camera 
and a part continues to Bob through the second fiber. During the calibration and characterization of Bob’s 
part we use the first pathway and during the characterization of Eve’s part we use the second pathway. 
2. Calibration and wavefront-shaping procedure 
The complex wavefront-shaping algorithm to create a focused laser spot on the fiber output facet without 
information about the configuration of the fiber-based scrambler is as follows. We use the DMD to control 
the spatial phase profile of light at the fiber output facet. Each mirror of the DMD can be set to two 
different tilt angles. By controlling the tilt of every mirror, 2D binary gratings can be created [37]. With 
an appropriately tilted input light field, the diffracted light propagates along the normal of the DMD 
surface (see Fig. 1 ‘Alice’). The DMD area of 510 × 510 pixels covered by an expanded laser beam is 
divided into 𝑁CDE = 	34 × 34  segments. Each segment consists of 15 × 15  micromirrors. Alice 
modulates the phase of a single segment by shifting the grating pattern over 2π in three steps. In total 3468 
different phase masks were used. To guarantee the security of the wavefront shaping procedure, each 
pulse Alice sends contains only 80 ± 30 photons. The single segment that is modified contains on 
average less than a photon. Bob measures the intensity in S = 36 points on the fiber output facet or on a 
camera frame and sends this information back to Alice via a classical channel. In our experiments, a grid 
of 6 × 6 points with 3.2 µm step size on the fiber output is used. However, the position of the symbols is 
not restricted and can be selected randomly. They repeat the measurements 50 times for each phase mask 
in random order. After all measurements, Alice sums all corresponding frames for each measurement. 
She now has high-quality images that she can use to calculate the transmission matrix. The time required 
for the optimization procedure is 3 minutes and limited by the frame rate of the camera we used. The	security	of	 the	wavefront-shaping	procedure	 is	based	on	 the	same	arguments	as	 that	of	 the	security	of	 the	quantum	communication	after	completion	of	 the	wavefront	shaping:	 the	no-cloning	theorem	forbids	an	attacker	 to	 fully	characterize	 the	 light	pulse	containing	 fewer	photons	 than	the	number	of	fiber	modes	and	scrambled	by	the	multimode	fiber.	Eve	can	record	the	light	that	is	sent	by	Alice.	However,	since	there	is	very	little	difference	between	the	different	phase	masks	(since	there	is	less	than	photon	in	each	segment),	it	is	impossible	for	her	to	know	what	segment	Alice	is	probing.	Therefore,	
if	Eve	‘replays’	the	field	to	Bob’s	fiber,	she	will	just	have	to	send	some	arbitrary	wavefront.	Now,	when	Alice	sums	Bob’s	camera	frames,	she	will	not	get	a	high-quality	speckle	image.	Instead,	she	will	get	a	completely	washed-out	noise	pattern,	which	will	signal	the	presence	of	the	eavesdropper.	Since	Alice	and	Bob	have	not	shared	any	secrets	yet,	no	information	leak	is	possible.	We	have	characterized	the	fidelity	(efficiency)	of	the	wavefront	shaping	by	the	parameter	α2	=	Pf	/	P0,	where	Pf	 is	the	power	in	the	focus	area	with	a	center	corresponding	to	that	of	the	focal	spot	and	a	diameter	equal	to	the	FWHM	of	the	Gaussian	spot.	P0	is	the	total	power	on	the	fiber	output.	We	assume	that	any	losses	don’t	influence	the	wavefront	shaping	quality	but	only	the	total	signal.	In	the	presented	experiments,	α2	is	10%.	In	our	experimental	setup,	the	fidelity	was	limited	by	Eve’s	interception	part	in	the	transmission	line	(see	Figure	1).	In	practice,	an	uninterrupted	fiber	should	be	used.	For	such	fibers,	a	fidelity	close	to	π/4	was	reported	experimentally	for	phase-only	wavefront	shaping	[19].	
3. Image processing The	signal	was	recorded	by	a	HiCAM	5000	High-speed	Intensified	Camera	(Lambert	Instruments,	the	Netherlands)	with	512x512	pixels	and	a	speed	of	5000	fps.	To	keep	well-defined	sensitivity,	the	incident	photon	 flux	 is	restricted	 to	not	exceed	5	detection	events	per	 frame	on	average.	To	 investigate	the	parameters	of	secure	communication	with	a	higher	number	of	photons,	we	summed	up	the	required	number	of	frames	measured	in	the	same	conditions.	As	a	result,	an	event	with	two	or	more	photons	at	one	point	can	be	easily	detected.	
4. Attacker model Alice	uses	the	continuous-wave	linearly	polarized	output	of	a	He-Ne	laser	with	a	wavelength	of	633	nm.	We	assume	that	Bob	has	S	detectors,	where	S	<	N.	We	aim	at	proving	security	of	our	multimode-fiber-based	method	of	communication.	In	particular,	we	give	security	bounds	in	the	case	where	Eve’s	attack	on	the	quantum	channel	is	not	restricted.	We	consider	the	following	classification	of	attacker	models,	following	Scarani	et	al.	[4]		We	analyze	individual	attacks	and	their	essential	subfamily,	the	intercept-resend	attacks.	As	the	name	indicates,	in	this	class	of	attacks,	Eve	intercepts	the	signal	somewhere	on	its	way	from	Alice	to	Bob,	performs	a	measurement	on	it,	and	prepares	a	new	signal	that	she	sends	to	Bob	(see	Fig.	1).	The	part	of	the	fiber	controlled	by	Bob	is	inaccessible	to	Eve.	
Collective	attacks,	which	imply	that	Eve	keeps	data	in	a	quantum	memory	until	the	end	of	the	classical	post	processing,	are,	fortunately,	not	applicable	for	our	method.	The	great	advantage	of	our	multimode-fiber-based	method	 is	 that	 it	doesn’t	 require	a	quantum	key	sifting	step	or	any	other	classical	post	processing.	Eve	would	not	benefit	from	storing	all	the	intercepted	light	in	a	quantum	memory	during	the	calibration	phase	because	1)	she	will	never	find	out	how	to	combine	them	successfully	(only	Alice	knows	the	order	of	the	phase	masks)	and	2)	her	intercept	attack	would	be	detected,	since	Eve	would	be	forced	to	send	random	wavefronts	to	Bob.		
General	 attacks,	 includes	 many	 possible	 variations	 and	 cannot	 be	 efficiently	 parametrized.	Nevertheless,	bounds	for	unconditional	security	have	been	found	in	many	cases	and	in	all	these	cases,	it	turns	out	that	the	bound	is	the	same	as	for	collective	attacks	[4].	
Hacking	 attacks	 are	 related	 to	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 a	 practical	 implementation.	 The	 best-known	example	is	the	family	of	Trojan	horse	attacks,	in	which	Eve	probes	the	settings	of	Alice’s	and/or	Bob’s	devices	by	sending	some	light	into	the	system	and	register	the	reflected	signal.	However,	in	the	setup	where	light	goes	only	one	way,	the	solution	against	Trojan	horse	attacks	consists	in	using	an	optical	isolator	[4],	which	can	be	easily	implemented	in	our	setup.	
5. Information gained by bob Alice	uses	 the	 continuous-wave	 linearly	polarized	output	 of	 a	He-Ne	 laser	with	 a	wavelength	of	633	nm.	We	assume	that	Bob	has	S	detectors,	where	S	<	N.	The	maximum	amount	of	information	that	Bob	can	read	out	per	received	photon	is	HB	=	log2(S).	In	case	of	S	=	36	symbols	this	maximum	is	HB	≈	5.2	bit	of	information.	However,	for	a	real-life	situation,	the	fidelity	of	wavefront	shaping	will	not	be	unity.	The	information	Bob	can	gain	per	single-photon	detection	event	in	this	scenario	can	be	calculated	as	
HB	≡	H(B)	–	H(B|s),	 (S1)	
where	H(B)	is	the	entropy	of	the	received	alphabet,	H(B|s)	the	conditional	entropy	at	the	receiver	side	under	the	condition	that	symbol	s	was	sent.	We	consider	the	situation	when	Bob	takes	into	account	only	the	symbols	for	which	he	got	a	click	on	one	of	the	S	detectors.	The	probability	of	getting	a	click	on	detector	
b	in	a	case	a	random	unknown	symbol	is	sent,	is	𝑃(𝑏) = 1	𝑆 	. The	total	entropy,	given	that	there	was	a	click	on	one	of	the	detectors	is	
𝐻(𝐵) = −X𝑃(𝑏) log: 𝑃(𝑏)0\71 = log:(𝑆). Now	we	calculate	the	conditional	entropy	H(B|s),	which	is	the	amount	of	information	that	is	needed	to	describe	measurement	outcome	B	given	that	the	symbol	s	is	known.	The	probability	of	getting	a	click	on	detector	b	given	that	symbol	s	was	sent,	is	
𝑃(𝑏|𝑠) =
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧ α:α: 	+ 	1	–	α:𝑁 − 1 (𝑆 − 1) ,																				if	𝑠 = 𝑏1 − α:(𝑁 − 1) iα: 	+ 	1	–	α:𝑁 − 1 (𝑆 − 1)j , if	𝑠 ≠ 𝑏
 
where	N	is	the	number	of	modes,	S	is	the	number	of	symbols,	and	α:	is	the	fidelity	of	the	wavefront	shaping.	Here	we	consider	only	the	events	with	a	click	on	a	detector.	As	a	result,	the	conditional	entropy	is	 𝐻(𝐵|𝑆) = −(𝑆 − 1)𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 ≠ 𝑏)log:l𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 ≠ 𝑏)m− 𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏) log:l𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏)m. Using	equations	(S1),	(S3)	and	(S5)	we	find	that	the	information,	which	Bob	can	get	per	single-photon	detection	in	case	of	non-perfect	wavefront	shaping,	is		𝐻n = log:(𝑆) + (𝑆 − 1)𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 ≠ 𝑏)log:l𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 ≠ 𝑏)m+ 𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏) log:l𝑃(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏)m. This	value	was	used	to	analyse	the	parameters	for	which	the	amount	of	 information	per	photon	gained	by	Bob	 in	 imperfect	 conditions	becomes	more	 than	 the	 theoretically	possible	maximum	of	information	gained	by	Eve.	We	also	calculate	the	probability	of	getting	a	click	on	detector	s	given	that	symbol	s	was	sent	in	case	of	non-ideal	detectors	and	losses	due	to	the	propagation	through	a	fiber.	Alice	sends	a	symbol	s	with	field	amplitude	μ	through	a	fiber	with	attenuation	𝑎	(in	dB/km)	and	length	L	(in	km).	The	efficiency	and	dark	count	rate	of	Bob’s	detectors	are	d	and	pdark	,	respectively.	Similar	to	Eq.	S4	we	can	get	the	practical	probability	 to	 detect	 the	 correct	 symbol	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 wavefront	 shaping	 fidelity	 α: 	(the	probability	of	getting	a	click	on	detector	b	given	that	symbol	s	=	b	was	sent):	
𝑃pq(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏, α:) = 	 α:𝜇:𝑑10$st18 +	𝑝uvqwα:𝜇:𝑑10$st18 	+ 	1	–	α:𝑁 − 1 (𝑆 − 1)𝜇:𝑑10$st18 + 𝑆𝑝uvqw,		 As	a	result,	the	acceptable	level	of	the	error	rate	in	the	quantum	channel	between	Alice	and	Bob	can	be	calculated	as		 𝑄𝐸𝑅CD{|qD = 1 − 𝑃pq(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏, α:). 
(S2)	
(S3)	
(S4)	
(S5)	
(S6)	
(S7)	
(S8)	
An	eavesdropper	employing	an	intercept-resend	strategy	on	all	photons	would	induce	an	additional	qudit	error	rate.	The	error	rate	in	the	quantum	channel	can	be	used	to	detect	the	presence	of	Eve.	We	can	calculate	qudit	error	rate	after	Eve’s	interception	as	[29]:		𝑄𝐸𝑅}~Dq{Dp}~ = 1 − 𝑃pq(𝑏|𝑠 = 𝑏, 𝛽:α:	), where	𝛽:	is	Eve’s	best	possible	fidelity:	β2	=	μ2/(μ2	+	2N)	(see	Ref.	[30]	for	details).		
6. Security analysis for a single-photon fock state Alice	uses	 the	 continuous-wave	 linearly	polarized	output	 of	 a	He-Ne	 laser	with	 a	wavelength	of	633	nm.	We	assume	that	Bob	has	S	detectors,	where	We	assume	that	Alice	uses	a	perfect	single-photon	source	to	send	symbols	and	Eve	can	read	the	signal	somewhere	in	the	middle	of	the	fiber,	potentially	close	 to	Alice	 or	 close	 to	Bob.	Additionally,	 since	Alice	 sends	 a	 single	photon,	we	 assume	 that	Eve	performs	intensity	measurements.	We	now	find	a	strict	upper	limit	of	information	that	can	be	gained	by	Eve	by	considering	the	hypothetical	scenario	(excluded	by	our	calibration	process)	where	Eve	somehow	knows	the	basis	(what	field	arrives	at	pixel	e	of	her	detector	when	Alice	sends	a	given	symbol	s),	but	is	not	able	to	build	a	passive	linear-optical	mode	convertor	to	sort	the	intercepted	photons	efficiently	into	
S	detectors.	Let's	call	this	the	field	transmission	function	tes.	Neglecting	losses	and	assuming	Eve	has	a	perfect	detector	(with	N	pixels,	one	for	each	mode	in	the	fiber),	she	will	get	exactly	one	click	on	one	pixel	of	her	detector	for	each	symbol	that	is	sent.	We	are	now	interested	in	calculating	how	much	information	Eve	obtains	by	recording	this	single	photon.	The	maximum	amount	of	information	that	Eve	can	get	is	
HE	≡	H(E)	–	H(E|s).	Here,	 the	entropy	𝐻(𝐸)	is	 the	amount	of	 information	 that	 is	needed	to	describe	a	measurement	outcome	𝐸	and	the	conditional	entropy	𝐻(𝐸|𝑠)	is	the	amount	of	information	that	is	needed	to	describe	this	outcome	when	it	is	known	which	symbol	𝑠	was	sent.	By	Bayes’	rule	for	conditional	entropy,	the	difference	between	the	two	entropies	𝐻 	is	the	maximum	amount	of	information	that	Eve	can	possibly	gain.	We	are	now	left	with	the	task	of	calculating	the	conditional	entropy	given	that	the	symbol	s	 is	known.		
𝐻(𝐸|𝑠) = −X𝑃(𝑒|𝑠) log: 𝑃(𝑒|𝑠) ,	with	P(e|s)	≡	|tes|2	the	probability	for	a	photon	sent	as	symbol	s	to	arrive	at	pixel	e.	Since	there	are	no	losses,	 |𝑡|: = 1 .	 The	 exact	 value	of	𝐻(𝐸|𝑠) 	depends	on	 the	unknown,	 random	 transmission	matrix	elements	and,	therefore,	is	impossible	to	predict	in	advance.	However,	we	can	readily	find	the	ensemble	averaged	value	⟨𝐻(𝐸|𝑠)⟩ ,	 i.e.	 the	conditional	entropy	averaged	over	all	possible	random	transmission	matrices	of	the	fiber.	To	do	so,	we	assume	that	⟨|tes|2⟩	=	1/N	and	that	the	elements	|tes|2	are	drawn	from	independent	exponential	distributions.	 In	 the	case	of	a	 large	number	of	modes	N,	 the	distribution	of	 |tes|2	 equals	P(|tes|2)	 =	N	exp(–|tes|2N).	 To	 calculate	 the	 expected	 value	 for	H(E|s),	we	average	over	realizations	of	disorder.	Substituting	yes	≡	|tes|2N	we	can	write	
⟨𝐻(𝐸|𝑠)⟩ ≡ − 1𝑁 exp(−𝑦)𝑦 log: 𝑦𝑁 68

 𝑑𝑦. Since	the	distribution	of	y	does	not	depend	on	s	or	e,	we	can	omit	averaging	over	all	symbols	⟨𝐻(𝐸|𝑠)⟩ = − exp(−𝑦)𝑦(log: 𝑦 − log: 𝑁)68 𝑑𝑦=	 log: 𝑁 − exp(−𝑦)𝑦68 log: 𝑦 𝑑𝑦. This	integral	evaluates	to	
(S11) 
(S10)	
(S12) 
(S13) 
(S9)	
⟨𝐻(𝐸|𝑠)⟩ = log: 𝑁 − 1 − 𝛾ln2 , with	the	Euler	constant	γ	≈	0.577216.	Using	(1)	we	finally	find	⟨𝐻⟩ = 1 − 𝛾ln2 ≈ 0.61	bit. Hence,	Eve	gains	only	0.61	bit	of	information	per	transmitted	symbol	at	best,	regardless	of	the	number	of	 symbols	 or	modes	 even	 in	 the	 extreme	 case	when	 she	knows	 the	 exact	 basis.	Under	 the	 same	conditions,	Bob	will	have	at	maximum	𝐻(𝑆) 	= 	log2(𝑆) 	≈ 	5.2	bit	of	information	per	transmitted	symbol	for	36	symbols.	As	a	result,	⟨HE⟩	<<	HB,	guaranteeing	the	security	of	the	method.	
7. Security analysis for coherent state and phase measurements Alice	uses	 the	 continuous-wave	 linearly	polarized	output	 of	 a	He-Ne	 laser	with	 a	wavelength	of	633	nm.	We	assume	that	Bob	has	S	detectors,	where	We	assume	that	Eve	is	somehow	able	to	record	the	field	in	each	of	the	fiber	modes	independently,	e.g.	by	a	homodyning	technique.	The	accuracy	of	these	measurements	will	be	limited	by	shot	noise	in	the	reference.	When	Alice	sends	a	symbol	s	with	field	amplitude	μ,	at	Eve's	side	the	field	in	mode	e	equals	Ee	=	μtes.	However,	due	to	shot	noise,	Eve	will	actually	measure	(𝐄D) =μtes	+	ξe,	with	ξe	a	noise	term	with	𝜉 = 0	and	|𝜉|:HHHHHH = 1	photon,	where		∙		indicates	averaging	over	measurements	[30].		We	now	proceed	to	calculate	the	amount	of	information	that	Eve	gains	by	doing	this	measurement.	Eve	can	first	project	her	measurement	of	the	field	at	the	fiber	output	𝐄Don	the	basis	of	symbols	by	simply	multiplying	with	𝑡$1.	When	all	modes	of	the	fiber	are	used	(S	=	N)	and	the	fiber	is	lossless,	tes	is	unitary.	After	performing	the	transformation,	Eve	will	have	found	the	vector	𝐄 ≡ 𝑡$1𝐄D,	where	each	element	 in	E	corresponds	 to	a	symbol.	Averaged	over	measurements	we	 find	𝐄H = 𝜇 ,	where	μs	is	a	vector	with	a	value	of	μ	at	index	s,	and	zero	everywhere	else.	Importantly,	since	the	transformation	is	unitary	and	the	noise	in	different	components	of	𝐄D	is	uncorrelated,	the	transformation	does	not	alter	the	noise	statistics	of	the	elements	of	E:	i.e.	the	noise	term	has	a	complex	Gaussian	distribution	with	|𝜉|:HHHHHH = 1	photon.	When	S	<	N,	it	is	still	possible	to	define	a	unitary	matrix	tes	that	maps	all	possible	symbols	to	the	first	S	indices	of	E	and	maps	all	unused	state	to	the	remaining	indexes.	Eve	can	simply	discard	the	values	at	these	remaining	indices	since	they	will	never	contain	any	information.	Therefore,	below	we	consider	E	to	be	a	vector	of	length	S.		When	Alice	sends	symbol	s,	the	transformed	vector	E	is	drawn	from	the	probability	density	function		
𝑃(𝐄|𝑠) = 𝑒$‖𝐄$ ‖:𝜋 	. The	differential	 entropy	of	 this	 complex	multivariate	normal	distribution	 is	 given	by	𝐻(𝐸|𝑠) 	=	𝑆	 log: 𝜋 	+ 	𝑆/ln	(2).	We	need	to	compare	this	value	to	the	entropy	for	the	case	that	it	is	not	known	what	symbol	was	sent.	In	this	case,	the	probability	density	equals	
𝑃(𝐄) = 1𝑆X𝑒$‖𝐄$ ‖:𝜋071 	. Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 no	 known	 closed-form	 expression	 for	 the	 entropy	 of	 such	 a	 Gaussian	mixture	[38].	Therefore,	we	use	a	Monte	Carlo	approach	to	calculate	the	entropy	of	(Eq.	S10)	numerically	(see	Figure	3(b)).	Additionally,	it	is	straightforward	to	derive	an	upper	limit	for	the	entropy.	First,	we	realize	that	the	real	parts	of	the	components	of	E	all	have	a	mean	value	of	μ/S	and	a	variance	of	1: +	(0	–	1)0 0: + 	10 𝜇	– 0: = 	 1: 	+ 9(0	–	1)09 .	The	imaginary	parts	have	a	mean	of	0	and	a	variance	of	1/2.	The	maximum	entropy	distribution	for	a	given	variance	is	Gaussian.	Therefore,	our	distribution	(see	Eq.	S17)	must	have	a	lower	entropy	than	a	Gaussian	with	the	same	variance.	The	differential	entropy	for	this	Gaussian	 is	 simply	 given	 by	 𝐻(𝑬)|ppDq 	= 	½ log:(|2𝜋𝑒𝛴|)	= 	𝑆	 log: 𝜋 	+ 	𝑆/ln(2)	+ (𝑆/2)	 log:(1	 + 	2𝜇:(𝑆	– 	1)/𝑆:)	with	Σ	the	covariance	matrix,	which	is	diagonal	in	our	case.	Half	of	the	
(S14) 
(S15) 
(S16) 
(S17) 
diagonal	elements	are	½	+	μ2(S	–	1)/S2	(for	the	real	parts),	the	rest	(for	the	imaginary	parts)	is	½,	so	|2𝜋𝑒𝛴|	 = 	(𝜋𝑒)0l𝜋𝑒(1	+ 2𝜇:(𝑆	– 	1)	𝑆$:)m0.	The	upper	limit	for	the	entropy	gained	by	Eve	follows	by	subtracting	H(E|s),	and	also	realizing	that	Eve	cannot	collect	more	information	than	what	is	being	sent	by	Alice.	 𝐻 < min i𝑆2 log: ¦1 + 2𝜇: 𝑆 − 1𝑆: § , log: 𝑆j. As	long	as	HE	<	HB,	the	method	remains	secure	even	in	the	extreme	case	of	a	weak	coherent	light	source	with	more	than	1	photon	per	pulse	in	a	non-secret	basis.	
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